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OPTIMAL TWO-PART TARIFF LICENSING CONTRACTS WITH 
DIFFERENTIATED GOODS AND ENDOGENOUS R&D 
 
Ramón Faulí-Oller and Joel Sandonís  
 
ABSTRACT 
  In this paper we get the optimal two-part tariff contract for the licensing of a cost 
reducing innovation to a differentiated goods industry of a general size. We analyze the cases 
where the patentee is an independent laboratory or an incumbent firm. We show that, 
regardless of the number of firms, the degree of product differentiation and the type of 
patentee, the innovation is licensed to all firms. Moreover, we endogenize R&D investment 
and get that an internal patentee invests more (less) in R&D when the technological 
opportunity is low (high). 
JEL classification: L11, L13 and L14. 
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 1 Introduction
Nowadays, innovation is recognized by economists as a crucial ingredient of growth. This has
motivated the development of a huge literature analyzing the determinants of innovation. In
particular, one of the main issues is whether the market provides ￿rms with the right incentives
to invest in R&D. Since Schumpeter￿ s seminal work, there have been many empirical and theo-
retical papers addressing the e⁄ect of competition on R&D investment. However the results are
inconclusive. One common characteristic of many of these papers is that they do not consider
the existence of a market for technology. In other words, the return to R&D investment comes
from the ￿nal good market.
In this paper, we add to this literature by allowing for the existence of a market for technology.
We consider the case of a research laboratory that owns a process innovation that allows to
reduce the production cost of a given industry. We consider two cases. If the laboratory remains
independent as an external patentee, it obtains revenues from the licensing of the patented
innovation to the ￿rms producing in this industry. Another possibility is that the laboratory
integrates vertically with one of the ￿rms in the industry, becoming an internal patentee. In
this case, it may obtain revenues not only from licensing but also from participating in the ￿nal
goods market.
As the literature on patent licensing has pointed out, the pro￿ts of licensing depend on the
type of licensing contracts that are available to the patentee. The earlier papers (Kamien and
Tauman (1984,1986), Katz and Shapiro (1986) and Kamien et al. (1992)) obtain that licensing
through a ￿xed fee or an auction is more pro￿table for an independent laboratory than licensing
through a royalty. In practice, however, licensing contracts very often include both a ￿xed fee
and a royalty (for example, Rostocker (1984) and Yanagawa and Wada (2000) show that this is
the case for approximately half of the licensing contracts). In spite of this empirical fact, only
2a few papers have studied these types of contracts (Fauli-Oller and Sandonis (2002, 2006), Sen
and Tauman (2007) and Erutku and Richelle (2007).
In this paper, we obtain the optimal two-part tari⁄ licensing contract for the general case of
a n-￿rms oligopolistic industry producing di⁄erentiated goods. We analyze the case where the
patentee is an independent laboratory as well as the case where it is an incumbent patentee.
We show that, in both cases, and regardless of the size of the innovation, the number of ￿rms
in the industry and the degree of product di⁄erentiation the innovation is licensed to all ￿rms
in the industry.
In the last part of the paper, we endogenize the size of the innovation by allowing the patentee
to invest in cost-reducing R&D. This allows us to compare the optimal R&D investment of the
laboratory when it is an outsider to the industry and when it is vertically integrated with one
of the ￿rms in the industry. We obtain that a vertically integrated laboratory invest more in
R&D than an independent laboratory when the R&D investment is costly. This result has a nice
empirical implication regarding the internal organization of leading innovative ￿rms. When the
technological opportunity of the industry is high, we can expect that innovation is dominated
by independent research laboratories. In contrast, when it is low, vertically integrated ￿rms are
the ones expected to be the leaders in innovation activities.
There are two papers closely related to ours: Sen and Tauman (2007) and Erutku and
Richelle (2007). They analyze the case of homogenous goods. The distinguishing feature of our
paper is that we consider di⁄erentiated goods. Erutku and Richelle (2007) study the optimal
two-part tari⁄ contract to license a cost-reducing innovation for the case of an independent
laboratory. They show that, regardless of the number of ￿rms in the industry, the innovation is
licensed to all ￿rms. In this paper, we show that their result extends to the case of di⁄erentiated
goods and also to the case of a vertically integrated laboratory.
3On the other hand, Sen and Tauman (2007) study the optimal auction plus royalty licesing
policy for a general size oligopoly and for the cases of an internal and an external patentee. The
di⁄erence with respect to a two-part tari⁄ contract is that, in an auction plus royalty contract,
the ￿xed part is determined through an auction. They show that the innovation is licensed to
all ￿rms (except perhaps one). They also study the incentives to innovate. They show that the
di⁄erence between post-innovation and pre-innovation pro￿ts is always higher for an external
patentee. The intuition is that whereas the independent laboratory earns no pro￿t in the absence
of the innovation, an incumbent patentee earns the market pro￿ts. As they consider that the
R&D investment increases the probability of obtaining a given cost reducing innovation, they
obatin that the external patentee invests more in R&D.
In this paper, we adopt a di⁄erent modelling strategy because R&D, in our model, determines
the cost reduction. Therefore, in our setting, what matters is not the di⁄erence between post-
innovation and pre-innovation pro￿ts but the marginal pro￿tability of R&D investment. We
do not claim that our approach is more realistic than Sen and Tauman￿ s. We only want to
stress that in a framework where R&D allows to reduce production costs in a continuous way,
an incumbent patentee may have more incentives to innovate than an independent laboratory.
We see our result as complementary to the one in Sen and Tauman (2007).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model for the cases of an
independent laboratoty and an incumbent patentee. In Section 3, we compare their incentives
to innovate. Finally, we conclude in Section 4. All proofs that are omitted from the text are
relegated to an Appendix.
42 Model
We consider n symmetric ￿rms competing in quantities and selling di⁄erentiated goods (i =
1:::n). Firm i sells good i. Inverse demand of good i is given by:





where qi is the quantity sold of good i. All ￿rms produce with marginal cost c < a.
We analyze two di⁄erent settings. In the ￿rst model, we assume that there is an independent
research laboratory that owns a patented process innovation. In the second model, the laboratory
is vertically integrated with one of the competing ￿rms in the industry. The innovation allows
the ￿rms to reduce their cost of production to c ￿ ". We aim to derive the optimal two-part
tari⁄ licensing contract (F;r) for both the external and the internal patentee, where F speci￿es
a non-negative ￿xed fee and r a linear per-unit royalty.
Although most of the papers in the literature impose non-negative royalties (exceptions are
Liao and Sen (2005) and Erutku and Richelle (2007)), for simplicity, we solve the model without
taking into account this constraint.1
We start by analyzing the case of an external patentee.
2.1 The case of an external patentee
In this case, the timing of the game is as follows: in the ￿rst stage the patentee o⁄ers a two-part
tari⁄ contract (F;r) to the n competing ￿rms. In the second stage, ￿rms decide whether or not
to accept the contract. The ones that accept, pay F to the patentee. Finally, the ￿rms compete
￿ la Cournot with a cost inherited from the licensing stage.
1Our results would not change if we impose non-negative royalties whenever c is not very low.
5Assume that k ￿rms have accepted a licensing contract (F;r). Firms that have not accepted





(a ￿ c)(2 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿k(" ￿ r)
(2 ￿ ￿)(2 + ￿(n ￿ 1))
if r > " ￿
(a ￿ c)(2 ￿ ￿)
￿k
0 otherwise.
Observe that, if r is very low, the ￿rms that do not accept the contract are driven out of the





(a ￿ c)(2 ￿ ￿) ￿ (￿2 + ￿(1 + k) ￿ ￿n)(" ￿ r)
(2 ￿ ￿)(2 + ￿(n ￿ 1))
if r > " ￿
(a ￿ c)(2 ￿ ￿)
￿k
a ￿ c + " ￿ r
k + 1
otherwise.
Pro￿ts of non-accepting and accepting ￿rms are given, respectively, by ￿N(k;r) = (qN(k;r))
2
and ￿(k;r) = (q(k;r))
2.
In the second stage, given that k ￿ 1 ￿rms accept the contract, the kth ￿rm accepts the
contract whenever F ￿ ￿(k;r) ￿ ￿N(k ￿ 1;r). Obviously, as the laboratory maximizes pro￿ts,
in order for k ￿rms to accept the contract,2 it will choose F such that F = ￿(k;r)￿￿N(k￿1;r).
This implies that the problem of choosing the optimal contract (F;r) is equivalent to that of
choosing (k;r). Then, in the ￿rst stage, the external patentee solves the following problem:
Max k
k;r
(￿(k;r) ￿ ￿N(k ￿ 1;r) + rq(k;r)) (1)
s:t: 1 ￿ k ￿ n and r ￿ ".
We proceed as follows. First of all, we prove that the research laboratory ￿nds pro￿table
to license the innovation to all ￿rms in the industry. Then, we calculate the optimal royalty
once we replace k by n in expression (1). As far as the ￿rst result is concerned, we know
that with a ￿xed fee contract, the input would be sold to only a subset of ￿rms in order to
protect industry pro￿ts from competition (Kamien and Tauman (1986)). With a two-part tari⁄
2As
@(￿(k;w)￿￿N(k￿1;w))
@k < 0, this is the only equilibrium in the acceptance stage.
6contract, however, the laboratory can always license to one more ￿rm without a⁄ecting the level
of competition, by choosing an appropriate royalty. Before solving the program, the following
lemma shows that it is always pro￿table for the laboratory to license the innovation to all ￿rms
regardless of the total number of them in the industry. Assume that the laboratory licenses the
innovation to k ￿rms with a royalty r. The strategy is to show that the laboratory can always
increase pro￿ts by licensing the innovation to all ￿rms through a higher royalty (r < rE < ")
such that total industry output remains constant. In the particular case of homogeneous goods
this is very intuitive because it would imply keeping ￿nal price constant3. With di⁄erentiated
goods, however, it is just a technical condition that helps to get the result.
Lemma 1 Assume that the laboratory licenses to k ￿rms with a royalty r. It can always increase
pro￿ts by licensing to all ￿rms with a royalty r < rE ￿ " such that nq(n;rE) = (n￿k)qN(k;r)+
kq(k;r):
Proof. See Appendix.
This result is central to the paper and, therefore, it seems interesting to know whether
it holds for more general demand functions. In the Appendix we show that, for the case of
homogenoous goods, it holds for concave demands satisfying a technical restriction concerning
the third derivative of the inverse demand. We show that it also holds for the class of demands
P = A ￿ Xb, where b ￿ 1.
Using the result in the previous lemma, next proposition derives the optimal two-part tari⁄
contract to license to n ￿rms.
3This argument is used in Sen and Tauman (2007) to prove that with an auction plus royalty contract, the
input would be sold to all ￿rms. It is also used in Fauli-Oller and Sandon￿s (2007) in the context of an input
market. In both papers, only the case of homogeneous goods is analyzed.
7Proposition 1 The laboratory optimally licenses the innovation to all ￿rms. The optimal roy-
alty is: r￿(n) = r1 if " < "1 and r￿(n) = r2 otherwise, where.
r1 =
￿(n ￿ 1)((a ￿ c)(￿2 + ￿)￿ + "(4 + ￿(￿6 + ￿ + 2n))
2(4 + ￿(4(2 ￿ n) + ￿(6 + ￿(n ￿ 1) + (n ￿ 6)n)))
;
r2 =
(a ￿ c + ")￿(n ￿ 1)
2 + 2￿(n ￿ 1)
;
"1 =
(a ￿ c)(4 + ￿(￿6 + ￿(n ￿ 3)(n ￿ 1) + 4n))
￿(n ￿ 1)(2 + ￿(n ￿ 1))
Proof. See Appendix
Observe that the constraint r ￿ " is never binding in equilibrium. The reason is that the
objective function of the patentee can be expressed as the di⁄erence between market pro￿ts
n￿(n;r) + nrq(n;r) and the outside option of the licensees ￿N(n ￿ 1;r). Market pro￿ts are
increasing in r up to r￿(n), whereas the outside option is decreasing in r. The balance of the
two e⁄ects leads to a royalty lower than ". Notice also that the optimal royalty increases with
". The reason is that the higher the size of the innovation the lower the outside option of the
licensees for a given r. Then, the patentee is less interested in reducing the outside option and
increases the royalty to increase market pro￿ts.
2.2 The case of an internal patentee
In this subsection, we consider a situation where the innovation is owned by one the ￿rms
in the industry (say ￿rm 1). We have to distinguish two cases: If the innovation is drastic
(￿2a + 2c + (a ￿ c + ")￿ > 0)4, the patentee gets the monopoly pro￿ts in its market by not
licensing the innovation. If the innovation is not drastic, monopolization never occurs. The
timing of the game is as in the previous subsection. In this situation, in the market stage of the
game there are three di⁄erent cost levels: the owner of the innovation produces at c ￿ ", the
4Observe that this holds when the innovation is important " ￿
(a ￿ c)(2 ￿ ￿)
￿
:
8licensees at cost c￿"+r and the non-licensees at cost c. As a consequence, equilibrium outputs
are given respectively by:
If the innovation is non-drastic:
qI
P(k;r) =
￿ ￿2(c ￿ ") + a(2 ￿ ￿) + ￿(c + "(n ￿ k ￿ 2) + kr)
(2 ￿ ￿)(2 + ￿(n ￿ 1))
if r > " +
￿2a+2c+(a￿c+")￿
￿k
(a ￿ c + ")(2 ￿ ￿) + ￿kr
(2 ￿ ￿)(2 + ￿k)
otherwise.
qI(k;r) =
￿ a(2 ￿ ￿)(c ￿ " + r) + ￿(c + "(n ￿ k ￿ 2) ￿ (n ￿ k ￿ 1)r)
(2 ￿ ￿)(2 + ￿(n ￿ 1))
if r > " +
￿2a+2c+(a￿c+")￿
￿k
(a ￿ c ￿ ")(2 ￿ ￿) ￿ 2r




￿ (a ￿ c)(2 ￿ ￿) + ￿(￿"(k + 1) + kr)
(2 ￿ ￿)(2 + ￿(n ￿ 1))




If the innovation is drastic, non-licensees do not produce (qI
N(k;r) = 0). In this case, outputs
in equilibrium for the patentee and licensees are given respectively by:
qI
P(k;r) =
￿ (a ￿ c + ")
2
if r >
(a ￿ c + ")(2 ￿ ￿)
2
(a ￿ c + ")(2 ￿ ￿) + ￿kr
(2 ￿ ￿)(2 + ￿k)
otherwise.
qI(k;r) =
￿ 0 if r >
(a ￿ c + ")(2 ￿ ￿)
2
(a ￿ c ￿ ")(2 ￿ ￿) ￿ 2r
(2 ￿ ￿)(2 + ￿k)
otherwise.
Observe that subindex P stands for patentee, subindex N for non-licensees and superindex I
for the internal case. Market pro￿ts of the patentee, the accepting ￿rms and the non-accepting














In the second stage, given that k ￿ 1 ￿rms accept the contract, the kth ￿rm accepts the
contract whenever F ￿ ￿I(k;r) ￿ ￿I
N(k ￿ 1;r). Obviously, as the patentee maximizes licensing
9revenues5 it will choose F such that F = ￿I(k;r)￿￿I
N(k￿1;r). This implies that the problem
of choosing the optimal contract (F;r) is equivalent to that of choosing (k;r). Then, in the ￿rst







N(k ￿ 1;r) + rqI(k;r)
￿
(2)
s:t: 0 ￿ k ￿ n ￿ 1 and r ￿ ":.
Before solving that program, we are going to show that it is always pro￿table for the patentee
to license the innovation to all ￿rms regardless of the total number of ￿rms in the industry. The
strategy of the proof is to show that the patentee can always increase pro￿ts by licensing the
innovation to one more ￿rm through a higher royalty such that total industry output remains
constant. In the particular case of homogeneous goods this is very intuitive because it would
imply keeping price constant. With di⁄erentiated goods, however, it is just a technical condition
that helps to get the result.
Lemma 2 Assume that the patentee licenses to k ￿rms with a royalty r. The patentee can
always increase its pro￿ts by licensing to all ￿rms with a royalty r < rI ￿ " such that
(n ￿ 1)qI(n ￿ 1;rI) + qI
P(n ￿ 1;rI) = (n ￿ k ￿ 1)qI
N(k;r) + kqI(k;r) + qI
P(k;r)
Proof. See Appendix
In the Appendix we show that, for the case of homogenoous goods, the previous result holds
for concave demands satisfying the same technical restrictions as in the case of an external
patentee.
Next, we derive the optimal royalty to license the innovation to n ￿ 1 ￿rms.











, the optimal royalty is: rI￿(n) = " if " ￿ "I
1, rI￿(n) = rI
1 if "I







, the optimal royalty is: rI￿(n) = rI if " < "I




￿(a(￿2 + ￿)(￿2 + ￿(n ￿ 1)) + c(￿4 + ￿2 ￿ (￿2 + ￿)￿n) + "(n ￿ 1)(4 + ￿(￿8 + ￿ + 2n)))
2(4 + 4￿(￿2 + n) + ￿2(7 + (￿7 + n)n))
rI
2 =
(a ￿ c + ")(￿2 + ￿)2￿(n ￿ 1)
8 ￿ 2￿(8 + 3￿(n ￿ 1) ￿ 4n)
"I
1 =
(a ￿ c)(￿2 + ￿)￿(￿2 + ￿(n ￿ 1))
8 ￿ ￿(￿￿(6 + ￿) ￿ 4(n ￿ 3) + ￿(4 + ￿)n)
"I
2 =
(a ￿ c)(2 ￿ ￿)(8 + 8￿(n ￿ 2) + 2￿2(5 ￿ 6n + n2) ￿ ￿3(2 ￿ 3n + n2)
￿(￿8 + 8n ￿ 2￿2(n2 ￿ 1) + 4￿(2 ￿ 3n + n2) ￿ ￿3(2 ￿ 3n + n2))
Proof. See Appendix
It is interesting to note that r
I￿(n) > r￿(n). The result is very intuitive because the internal
patentee obtains revenues not only from licensing but also by selling the good in the market.
Therefore, it is more interested in controlling competition by charging a higher royalty. Observe
that for the particular case n = 2, the outside option does not depend on the royalty and,
therefore, the patentee maximizes industry pro￿ts. This implies that "I
1 = "I
2.
3 Incentives to innovate
In the previous section, we have analyzed licensing contracts assuming that the innovation
already existed. The next step in the analysis is to endogenize the level of the innovation
through modelling the choice of R&D. Our aim is to compare the R&D investment of both the
internal and the external patentee.
11We consider that, previous to the licensing stage, the patentee chooses the level of R&D
investment " at the cost C(") = d"2, where d > n
4. In the licensing stage, the pro￿ts of the
external patentee (B(")), net of the R&D costs, are given by:
B(") =
8
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > :
n("2(￿2 + ￿)2(2 + ￿(n ￿ 1))2 + a2￿4(n ￿ 1)2 + c2￿4(n ￿ 1)2￿
￿2c"(2 + ￿(n ￿ 1))(8 + 8￿(n ￿ 2) + ￿3(n ￿ 1) + 2￿2(5 + (n ￿ 5)n))
+"(2 + ￿(n ￿ 1))(8 + 8￿(n ￿ 2)
+2a(￿c￿4(n ￿ 1)2 + ￿3(n ￿ 1) + 2￿2(5 + (n ￿ 5)n))))
4(2+￿(n￿1))2(4+￿(4(n￿2)+￿(6+￿(n￿1)+(n￿6)n))) if " < "1
(a ￿ c + ")
2 n
4 + 4￿(n ￿ 1)
otherwise.
For the case of an internal patentee, for simplicity, we focus on the case ￿ ￿ 2
n￿1, which
avoids corner solutions6. In this case, the pro￿ts of the internal patentee (BI(")), net of the






N(k ￿ 1;rI) + rqI(k;rI)
￿
if " ￿ "I
2
(a ￿ c + ")
2 (￿￿2 + (2 ￿ ￿)2n)
4(4 ￿ ￿(8 + 3￿(n ￿ 1) ￿ 4n)
otherwise.
The actual value of BI(") when " ￿ "I
2 is relegated to the Appendix.
Then, the external patentee will choose:
b " = argmax
"
fB(") ￿ C(")g,
and the internal patentee will choose:
b "I = argmax
" fBI(") ￿ C(")g




concavity and interior solutions.
6Observe that this implies that n ￿ 3.
12Next we compare both investments. Although interesting, this comparison has not received
much attention in the literature. To the best of our knowledge the only exception is Sen and
Tauman (2006). They also compare the incentives to innovate of both an external and an internal
patentee. They show that the di⁄erence between the post-innovation and pre-innovation pro￿ts
is always higher for an external patentee. The intuition is that whereas the external patentee
earns no pro￿t in the absence of the innovation, the internal patentee earns the market pro￿ts.
We adopt a di⁄erent modelling strategy because R&D, in our model, is a continuous variable
that determines the cost reduction and the post-innovation pro￿ts. Therefore, in our setting,
what matters is not the incremental pro￿ts of the investment but its marginal pro￿tability. In
this setting, we are going to show that an internal patentee may have more incentives to innovate.
Although we can not explicitly compare the equilibrium investments given their complexity, we
next plot in a three dimensional space b "I ￿b " for di⁄erent values of ￿; n and d. Figure 1 plots
the di⁄erence for d = 10 , ￿ 2 [2
9;1] and n 2 [10;30]. Ranges for ￿ and n are chosen such that
￿ ￿ 2
n￿1 and d >
n
4
are satis￿ed. Figures 2 and 3 plot the di⁄erence for values d = 30 and
d = 50 respectively.
Looking at the three ￿gures, it is easy to see that the region where an internal patentee
invests more in R&D gets larger as d increases. This has a nice empirical implication regarding
the internal organization of leading innovative ￿rms. When the technological opportunity of the
industry is high (d is low), we can expect that innovation is dominated by independent research
laboratories. In contrast, when it is low, vertically integrated laboratories are the ones expected
to be the leaders in innovation activities.
A second ￿nding is that an internal patentee invests more in R&D only when the goods are
close enough substitutes. The intuition is that an internal patentee is in a better position to
control for the level of competition given that it is an active ￿rm in ￿nal good industry.
13Figure 1: d = 10
Figure 2: d = 30
14Figure 3: d = 50
In order to be able to get explicit results on the R&D comparison, it seems interesting
to analyze the particular case where the good is homogenous (￿ = 1). This also facilitates the
comparison of our result with the one in Sen and Tauman (2007) that also considers homogenous
goods.
3.1 The case of homogeneous goods
In the case ￿ = 1, the constraint d > 1
2 guarantees that
b " =
(a ￿ c)n(1 + n(2n ￿ 1))
￿n(1 + n) + 4d(1 + n3)
and
b "I =
(a ￿ c)(3 + n(3 + n(￿1 + n(￿3 + 2n))
￿3 ￿ n(3 + (￿3 + n)n) + 4d(1 + n)2(3 + (￿3 + n)n)
are global maxima. As expected, the higher d, the lower b " and b "I, but we have also that total
expenditure in R&D (db "2 and db "2
I) is decreasing in d. Therefore 1
d measures the degree of
technological opportunity of the industry.
15The literature has extensively studied the relationship between R&D investment and com-
petition. It is possible to check that b "I is always increasing in n and b " increases with n whenever
R&D investment is expensive enough (d high enough). When d is low b " follows a U-shape with
respect to the number of ￿rms.
Next proposition compares both investments.
Proposition 3 The internal patentee invests more in R&D than the external patentee when
n ￿ 3 and d > b d(n), where b d(n) =
n2(￿3 + n(3n ￿ 4))
2(1 + n)(￿3 + (n ￿ 2)n2)
:
This result con￿rms the intuitions obtained from the ￿gures.
4 Conclusions
In this paper, we obtain the optimal two-part tari⁄ licensing contract for the general case of
a n-￿rms oligopolistic industry producing di⁄erentiated goods. We analyze the case where the
patentee is an independent laboratory as well as the case where it is an incumbent patentee.
We show that, in both cases, and regardless of the size of the innovation, the number of ￿rms
in the industry and the degree of product di⁄erentiation the innovation is licensed to all ￿rms
in the industry.
This result has been previously obtained for the particular case of homogenous goods and
an external patentee by Erutku and Richelle (2007). We show that it extends to the case of
di⁄erentiated goods, even when the patentee is an incumbent ￿rm in the industry. This may
seem counterintuitive, because an internal patentee has market pro￿ts to protect. However, we
have shown that she can always do it not by restricting the number of licensees but by increasing
the royalty.
16In the second part of the paper, we compare the incentives to innovate of an incumbent
patentee with those of an independent laboratory. We obtain that this comparison is ambiguous
and depends on the level of technological opportunity of the industry. In particular, we get that
when it is low (high), an internal (external) patentee optimally invests more in R&D. Our result
is interesting if we compare it with the one in Sen and Tauman (2007). They obtain that an
external patentee has always more incentives to innovate. This di⁄erence arises because R&D, in
our model, determines the cost reduction whereas in Sen and Tauman increases the probability of
getting a given innovation. Therefore, in our setting, what matters is not the di⁄erence between
post-innovation and pre-innovation pro￿ts but the marginal pro￿tability of R&D investment.
5 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
Let ￿(k;r) represent the laboratory￿ s pro￿t if it licenses to k ￿rms and sets a royalty r ￿ ".
We have that
￿(k;r) = B(k;r) ￿ k(qN(k ￿ 1;r))
2 ￿ (n ￿ k)(qN(k;r))
2 ￿ "(n ￿ k)qN(k;r):
Proof. where
B(k;r) = k(q(k;r))
2 + (n ￿ k)(qN(k;r))
2 + krq(k;r) + "(n ￿ k)qN(k;r)
Observe that we have expressed the pro￿ts of the incumbent patentee as the di⁄erence
between total industry pro￿ts (B(k;r)) and the pro￿ts of the remaining ￿rms. The e¢ ciency
term appears, because we are computing industry pro￿ts as if total output was produced using
the new technology.
Let rE solve nq(n;rE) = (n ￿ k)qN(k;r) + kq(k;r):
17We next prove that licensing to all ￿rm with royalty r < rE ￿ " is more pro￿table than
licensing to k ￿rms with a royalty r. This is equivalent to show that the following expression is
positive:
￿(n;rE) ￿ ￿(k;r) = B(n;rE) ￿ B(k;r) + k(qN(k ￿ 1;r))
2 + (n ￿ k)(qN(k;r))
2 +
+"(n ￿ k)qN(k;r) ￿ n(qN(n ￿ 1;rE))
2 :
It is convenient to proceed in two steps. We ￿rst prove that BI(n ￿ 1;rI) ￿ BI(n ￿ 1;rI) is
positive and then prove that the remaining terms are also positive.
If " ￿
(a ￿ c)(2 ￿ ￿)
￿k
￿ r ￿ ", we have that:
B(n;rE) ￿ B(k;r) =
k(1 ￿ ￿)(n ￿ k)(" ￿ r)2
n(2 ￿ ￿)2 ￿ 0
k(qN(k ￿ 1;r))
2 + (n ￿ k)(qN(k;r))
2 ￿ n(qN(n ￿ 1;rE))
2 =
k￿2(n ￿ k)(" ￿ r)2
n(2 ￿ ￿)2(2 + ￿(n ￿ 1))2 ￿ 0
If " ￿
(a ￿ c)(2 ￿ ￿)
￿(k ￿ 1)
< r < " ￿
(a ￿ c)(2 ￿ ￿)
￿k
; we have that
rE =
(a ￿ c + ")(2 ￿ ￿)(n ￿ k) + k(2 + ￿(n ￿ 1))r
(2 + ￿(k ￿ 1))n
where " > rE > r and qN(k;r) = 0.
We have to distinguish two cases:
If
("￿k(2+￿(n￿1))(n￿1)+a(￿2+￿)(2n+￿(k+(￿2+n)n))￿c(￿2+￿)(2n+￿(k+(￿2+n)n)))
(￿k(2+￿(n￿1))(n￿1)) < r ￿ "￿
(a ￿ c)(2 ￿ ￿)
￿k
,
we have that qN(n ￿ 1;rE) > 0. It is direct to see that:
B(n;rE) ￿ B(k;r) =
k(1 ￿ ￿)(n ￿ k)(a ￿ c + " ￿ r)2
n(2 + ￿(k ￿ 1))2 ￿ 0 (3)
Moreover, we have that
kqN(k ￿ 1;r) ￿ nqN(n ￿ 1;rE) =
(n ￿ k)(2 + ￿(n + k ￿ 2))((a ￿ c)(￿2 + ￿) + ￿k(" ￿ r))
(2 ￿ ￿)(2 + ￿(k ￿ 1))(2 + ￿(n ￿ 1))
: (4)
It is direct to see that (4) is decreasing in r and it amounts to zero in the upper bound of the
region. This implies that
k(qN(k ￿ 1;r))









then qN(n ￿ 1;rE) = 0. The previous calculations applied to this case prove the result.
If r ￿ " ￿
(a ￿ c)(2 ￿ ￿)
￿(k ￿ 1)
, we have that qN(n ￿ 1;rE) = 0 and qN(k ￿ 1;r) = 0. Then
￿(n;rE) ￿ ￿(k;r) = B(n;rE) ￿ BI(k;r), which is positive by (3).
Proof of Proposition 1
r1 =argmax
r n(￿(n;r) ￿ ￿N(n ￿ 1;r)) + nrq(n;r))
r2 =argmax
r n￿(n;r) + nrq(n;r)
If " = "1, then r1 = r2. This implies that the optimal royalty is r1 when " ￿ "1 and r2
otherwise.
Proof of Lemma 2
Let ￿I(k;r) represent the pro￿t of the incumbent patentee if it licenses k ￿rms and sets a
royalty r. It is very useful to express this pro￿t as:





























Proof. Observe that we have expressed the pro￿ts of the incumbent patentee as the di⁄erence
between total industry pro￿ts (BI(k;r)) and the pro￿ts of the remaining ￿rms. The e¢ ciency
term appears, because we are computing industry pro￿ts as if total output was produced using
the new technology.
Let rI solve (n ￿ 1)qI(n ￿ 1;rI) + qI
P(n ￿ 1;rI) = (n ￿ k ￿ 1)qI
N(k;r) + kqI(k;r) + qI
P(k;r).
19We next prove that licensing to all ￿rms with royalty r < rI ￿ " is more pro￿table than
licensing to k ￿rms with royalty r. This is equivalent to show that next expression is positive:











+"(n ￿ k ￿ 1)qI






It is convenient to proceed in two steps. We ￿rst prove that BI(n ￿ 1;rI) ￿ BI(n ￿ 1;rI)
is positive and then prove that the remaining terms are also positive. We ￿rst analyze the
non-drastic case (￿2a + 2c + (a ￿ c + ")￿ < 0):
If " ￿ r > " +
￿2a + 2c + (a ￿ c + ")￿
￿k
, we have that r ￿ rI =
"(n ￿ k ￿ 1) + kr
n ￿ 1
￿ ". It is
easy to check that:
BI(n ￿ 1;rI) ￿ BI(k;r) =
k(1 ￿ ￿)(n ￿ k ￿ 1)(" ￿ r)2


















￿2k(n ￿ k ￿ 1)(" ￿ r)2
(2 ￿ ￿)2(n ￿ 1)(2 + ￿(n ￿ 1))2 ￿ 0:
If
(a ￿ c)(￿2 + ￿) + "￿k
￿(k ￿ 1)
< r ￿ " +
￿2a + 2c + (a ￿ c + ")￿
￿k
; we have that
rI =
(a ￿ c + ")(1 + k ￿ n)(￿2 + ￿) + k(2 + ￿(n ￿ 1))r
(2 + ￿k)(n ￿ 1)
, " > rI > r and qI
N(k;r) = 0.
We have to distinguish two cases:
If





k(2 + ￿(n ￿ 1))
< r ￿ "+
￿2a + 2c + (a ￿ c + ")￿
￿k
,
we have that qI
N(n ￿ 2;rI) > 0. It is direct to see that:
BI(n ￿ 1;rI) ￿ BI(k;r) =
(1 ￿ ￿)k(n ￿ k ￿ 1)((a ￿ c + ")(￿2 + ￿) + 2r)2
(2 ￿ ￿)2(2 + ￿k)2(n ￿ 1)
￿ 0 (5)
Moreover, we have that
kqI
N(k ￿ 1;r) ￿ (n ￿ 1)qI















(a ￿ c)(￿2 + ￿) + "￿k
￿(k ￿ 1)
< r ￿





k(2 + ￿(n ￿ 1))
;
then qI
N(n ￿ 2;rI) = 0. The previous calculations applied to this case prove the result.
If r ￿
(a ￿ c)(￿2 + ￿) + "￿k
￿(k ￿ 1)
, we have that qI
N(n ￿ 2;rI) = 0 and qI
N(k ￿ 1;r) = 0. Then
￿I(n;rI) ￿ ￿I(k;r) = BI(n ￿ 1;rI) ￿ BI(k;r), which is positive by (5).
Next we analyze the case of a drastic innovation (￿2a + 2c + (a ￿ c + ")￿ > 0):
In this case, non-licensees do not produce and therefore we have that ￿I(n;rI) ￿ ￿I(k;r) =
BI(n ￿ 1;rI) ￿ BI(k;r).
If
(a ￿ c + ")(2 ￿ ￿)
2
￿ r ￿ ", only the incumbent patentee produces and then rI = r and
￿I(n;rI) ￿ ￿I(k;r) = BI(n ￿ 1;rI) ￿ BI(k;r) = 0.
If r <
(a ￿ c + ")(2 ￿ ￿)
2
, the licensees and the patentee are active. Then we have that,
￿I(n￿1;rI)￿￿I(k;r) = BI(n￿1;rI)￿BI(k;r) =
(1 ￿ ￿)k(n ￿ k ￿ 1)((a ￿ c + ")(￿2 + ￿) + 2r)2
(2 ￿ ￿)2(2 + ￿k)2(n ￿ 1)
￿ 0:




P(n ￿ 1;r) + (n ￿ 1)
￿
￿I(n ￿ 1;r) ￿ ￿I





P(n ￿ 1;r) + (n ￿ 1)￿I(n ￿ 1;r) + (n ￿ 1)rqI(n ￿ 1;r)
If " = "I
2, then rI
1 = rI
2. This implies that the optimal royalty is rI
1 when " ￿ "I
2 and
rI
2 otherwise. On the other hand, when " < "I




1 > " and therefore the
participation constraint is binding and the optimal royalty is ".







((￿2 + ￿)￿(2 + ￿(n ￿ 1))(n ￿ 1)(a(￿2 + ￿)(￿2 + ￿(n ￿ 1))
+c(￿4 + ￿2 ￿ (￿2 + ￿)￿n) + "(n ￿ 1)(4 + ￿(￿8 + ￿ + 2n)))((a ￿ c + ")
(￿2 + ￿) +
￿(a(￿2 + ￿)(￿2 + ￿(n ￿ 1)) + c(￿4 + ￿
2￿(￿2 + ￿)￿n)+
+"(n ￿ 1)(4 + ￿(￿8 + ￿ + 2n)))
4+4￿(n￿2)+￿2(7+(n￿7)n) ))
(2(4 + 4￿(n ￿ 2) + ￿2(7 + (n ￿ 7)n))) ￿ (2 + ￿(n ￿ 2))(n ￿ 1)
(" ￿
￿(a(￿2 + ￿)(￿2 + ￿(n ￿ 1)) + c(￿4 + ￿
2￿(￿2 + ￿)￿n) + "(n ￿ 1)
(4 + ￿(￿8 + ￿ + 2n)))
2(4+4￿(n￿2)+￿2(7+(n￿7)n)) )
(2a(￿2 + ￿) ￿ 2c(￿2 + ￿) + "(￿2 + ￿n+
￿(a(￿2 + ￿)(￿2 + ￿(n ￿ 1)) + c(￿4 + ￿
2￿(￿2 + ￿)￿n) + "(n ￿ 1)










￿(a(￿2 + ￿)(￿2 + ￿(n ￿ 1)) + c(￿4 + ￿
2￿(￿2 + ￿)￿n) + "(n ￿ 1)


























￿(a(￿2 + ￿)(￿2 + ￿(n ￿ 1)) + c(￿4 + ￿
2￿(￿2 + ￿)￿n)+



















The values of the optimal R&D investment.
b " =
(a ￿ c)(n(8 + 8￿(n ￿ 2) + ￿3(n ￿ 1) + 2￿2(5 + (n ￿ 5)n)))
((2 + ￿(n ￿ 1))(￿(￿2 + ￿)2n + 4d(4 + ￿(4(n ￿ 2) + ￿(6 + ￿(n ￿ 1) + (n ￿ 6)n)))))
:
22b "I =




2(3 + (n ￿ 5)n) ￿ 16￿(1 + n(3n ￿ 7))￿
￿4￿3(n ￿ 2)(￿2 + n(10 + (n ￿ 8)n)) ￿ 8￿
2(￿3 + n(19 + n(3n ￿ 16)))))
(￿
6(n ￿ 1)
3+4￿5(n ￿ 4)(n ￿ 1)
3+64n + 64￿(n ￿ 3)n + 16￿
2n(16 + (n ￿ 11)n)￿
￿16￿3(￿2 + (n ￿ 3)n(3n ￿ 5)) ￿ 4d(￿2 + ￿)
2(2 + ￿(n ￿ 1))
2
(4 + 4￿(n ￿ 2) + ￿
2(7 + (n ￿ 7)n)) ￿ 4￿
4(11 + n(￿41 + n(43 + (n ￿ 15)n))))
:
23Proof of Lemma 1 and 2 for a general demand and homogenous goods
Assume we have n ￿rms and market demand is given by P(X), where P0(X) < 0 and
P"(X) ￿ 0. Firms have constant marginal costs. Denote by C the sum of marginal costs. Then
in an interior equilibrium we have that:
nP(X) ￿ C + P0(X)X = 0 (6)




where X(C) is implicitly de￿ned in (6). We have that ￿0(C) > 0.
We start by Lemma 1. In the case of homogenous goods B(n;rE) ￿ B(k;r) = 0: Then, a









) ￿ 0 (7)
where C￿ = (n￿k+1)c+(k￿1)(c￿"+r), C = (n￿1)(c￿"+rE)+c and C = (n￿k)c+k(c￿"+r).
We have also that C￿ ￿ C =
(n￿k)("￿r)
n and C ￿ C =
k("￿r)






















For the case of an internal patentee (Lemma 2) a similar line of argument applies. For this
case we have that BI(n ￿ 1;rI) ￿ BI(k;r) = 0: Then, a su¢ cient condition for the laboratory









) ￿ 0 (8)
where C￿ = c ￿ " + (k ￿ 1)(c ￿ " + r) + (n ￿ k)c, C = 2c ￿ " + (n ￿ 2)(c ￿ " + rI) and
C = c ￿ " + k(c ￿ " + r) + (n ￿ k ￿ 1)c. We have also that C￿ ￿ C =
(n￿k￿1)("￿r)
n￿1 and
C ￿ C =
k("￿r)









n ￿ k ￿ 1
k









n ￿ k ￿ 1
k
It is tedious but direct to show that ￿"(C) > 0 if ￿P0(X) is log-concave and P000(X) ￿ 0.
We show that it also holds for the class of demands P = A ￿ Xb, where b ￿ 1.
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